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Abstract
Focused correlation compares the degree of association within an evidence set
to the degree of association in that evidence set given that some hypothesis is true.
A difference between the confirmation lent to a hypothesis by one evidence set and
the confirmation lent to that hypothesis by another evidence set is robustly tracked
by a difference in focused correlations of those evidence sets on that hypothesis,
provided that all the individual pieces of evidence are equally, positively relevant to
that hypothesis (Wheeler and Scheines 2010). If focused correlation is interpreted
as a ‘coherence’ measure, this result is theoretically significant because it establishes
conditions under which a difference in coherence entails a difference in confirma-
tion. However, the result is of limited practical benefit because the equal relevance
condition is a very strong restriction. In this essay we prove tracking results for fo-
cused correlation analogous to Wheeler and Scheines’s results but for cases involving
unequal relevance. Our result is robust as well, and we retain conditions for bidirec-
tional tracking between incremental confirmation measures and focused correlation.
The cases in which tracking fail are instructive, suggesting that focused correlation
is a stronger measure of evidential support than classical incremental confirmation
measures. We illustrate this point with examples, situate our results in relationship
to the noted impossibility results concerning Bayesian epistemic coherence measures,
and offer an additional reason for distinguishing classical, incremental confirmation
from other notions of confirmation.
1 Introduction
Auditors have found an irregularity in the books for Acme, Inc. Bungled paperwork
explains most anomalies of this kind, but fraud cannot be ruled out, so teams are as-
sembled to investigate. Team One learns that Carson, a longtime Acme bookkeeper, is
divorcing his wife, which is sad news for the Carson family, but of little interest to Team
One. Most people manage a divorce without defrauding their employer, after all. Team
Two learns that Carson has a Brazilian lover, but they merely pause to think, lucky
Carson. Team Three finds out that Carson took a flight to Rio de Janeiro seated beside
a stunning but dodgy Brazilian financier.
Considered in isolation, each team’s evidence signals little more than middle-life
boredom. Yet when taken together the evidence suggests fraud. It’s not the facts alone
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that warrant hauling in Carson for questioning, but rather how those pieces of evidence
fit together into a compelling case against him.
But what does it mean for evidence to ‘fit together,’ and what is it about combined
evidence that lends more support to a hypothesis than each piece of evidence on its
own? One answer is to compare the likelihood of evidence occurring together to its
co-occurrence given a cause or some unifying explanation. The events of the story are
unusual on their own, but a conspiracy to defraud Acme involving Carson provides a
unifying explanation for those events, one that would be alarming enough for Acme
investigators to want a word with Mr. Carson.
The core idea animating this example is encapsulated in a measure called focused
correlation (Myrvold 1996, Wheeler 2009), which is defined by Equation (1) for n binary
evidence variables and a single binary hypothesis variable.
ForH(E1, . . . ,En) =
P (H | E1 ∩ · · · ∩En)P (H)n−1
P (H | E1)× · · · × P (H | En)
=
P (E1 ∩ · · · ∩En | H) / P (E1 | H)× · · · × P (En | H)
P (E1 ∩ · · · ∩En) / P (E1)× · · · × P (En) . (1)
Focused correlation has been given a variety of interpretations: to capture the effect
that diversity of evidence has upon confirmation of some hypothesis (Myrvold 1996);
to provide a partial explication of the relationship between epistemic coherence and
incremental confirmation of a hypothesis (Wheeler 2009); and, in normalized form, to
provide an account of unified evidence for a hypothesis (Myrvold 2003). But, the basic
idea is that by comparing the degree of association within an evidence set to the degree of
association in that evidence set given some hypothesis, in certain circumstances several
questions about confirmation relationships between evidence and that hypothesis can be
answered.
The conditions under which focused correlation tracks confirmation, pace Myrvold
(2003), depend on what type of logical or causal structure governs the relationships
between evidence and hypothesis in a problem (Wheeler and Scheines 2010). For ex-
ample, Erik Olsson (2005) and Luc Bovens and Stephan Hartmann (2006) have drawn
attention to problematic features of models in which all binary evidence variables Ei
of a problem are conditionally independent of the binary hypothesis variable H, i.e.,
∀i 6= j,Ei ⊥ Ej | H. The correlation between any distinct pair of evidence variables Ei
and Ej in this class of models is the product of the correlations between each E and H
(Danks and Glymour 2001). But this fact yields counter-intuitive results if one interprets
association as epistemic coherence, since then association among the evidence is strictly
less than the (non-deterministic) confirmation that each piece of evidence lends to the
hypothesis.
In the case of focused correlation, it is easy to see from Equation (1) that the fo-
cused correlation of an evidence set with respect to some hypothesis under this condi-
tional independence assumption is strictly less than one, thus is negative, whereas the
confirmation of the hypothesis by that evidence may be positive. This conditional in-
dependence condition is central to the witness testimony models of (Olsson 2005) and
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(Bovens and Hartmann 2003), and it is the condition that drives their noted negative
results concerning the construction of a probabilistic measure of coherence (Wheeler
2009).
But, contra Olsson (2005, p. 135), there are interesting cases outside of this class of
models where a measure like focused correlation can be useful and, pace Luc Bovens and
Stephan Hartmann (2006), there are conditions under which a difference in confirmation
lent to some hypothesis by two evidence sets is tracked by a difference in their focused
correlation, even within this obstinate class of models.1 To illustrate, consider again
L’affaire de Carson. Suppose that a performance review of the Acme Investigation
Department involves comparing the evidence set E, consisting of a divorcing employee
who traveled with a dubious associate, to the evidence set E∗, consisting of a divorcing
employee who is having an affair. Acme is a big company with many cases on file,
and their models suggest that E is a better indicator of fraud than E∗ because fraud
is a slightly ‘better’ explanation for the co-occurrence of divorce and suspicious travel
than it is for divorce and adulterous affair. Question: under what conditions can Acme
management draw this inference?
In (Wheeler and Scheines 2010) sufficient conditions for a wide variety of incremental
confirmation measures are given under which a difference in focused correlation entails
a difference in confirmation lent to that hypothesis and vice versa. But their results
are only trivially true in this problematic class of models, because one of the conditions
for the comparison result is that all individual items of evidence have equal relevance
to the hypothesis. In effect this restrictive condition, when combined with the con-
ditional independence assumption mentioned above, deals with the problematic cases
driving Bovens and Hartmann’s counter-examples (Bovens and Hartmann 2003, 2006)
by ensuring that at least one of the antecedent conditions is false. The motivation for
this strong assumption is clear in their project, for they address whether a difference in
association of two evidence sets induced by some hypothesis can track confirmation of
that hypothesis. But including equal relevance as a ceteris paribus condition won’t do
for practical comparisons of evidence sets; it is much too restrictive.
In this paper we show the equal evidence assumption can indeed be relaxed to iden-
tifiable cases involving unequal relevance. Our result is robust as well, and we retain
conditions for bidirectional tracking between the class of incremental confirmation mea-
sures and focused correlation. The cases in which tracking fail are instructive, suggesting
that focused correlation is a stronger measure of evidential support than classical incre-
mental confirmation measures, and we illustrate this point through some examples.
The structure of the paper is as follows. In Section 2 we set up the machinery
by making explicit our notation and the confirmation measures we consider. Section
3 presents our results, and in Section 4 we explain why two common non-incremental
1Observe that this problematic class of models may be characterized by those in which this conditional
independence condition holds. Hence, that class of models—provided that the assumptions needed to
activate the theory of graphical causal models are satisfied—can be identified non-parametrically and
handled by other means. So, while true that no probabilistic measure of coherence can operate correctly
within this class, that’s only one way to look at it; another is to observe that there is no need for a
coherence measure in this class of models.
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confirmation measures are not tracked by focused correlation. This analysis offers further
evidence for distinguishing between classical, incremental confirmation measures, and
other notions of confirmation. Proofs are set in an appendix.
2 Setup
In this section we specify notation and list the confirmation functions we will consider.
Define a probability space (Ω,F , P ) such that F is a σ-algebra over a set Ω and
P : F −→ [0, 1] is a probability measure defined on the space (Ω,F , P ) satisfying
P1. P (Ω) = 1
P2. P (
⋃∞
i=1Xi) =
∑∞
i=i P (Xi), when Xi are countable, pairwise disjoint elements of
F .
A probability structure is a tuple M = (Ω,F , P, V ), where (Ω,F , P ) is a probability
space and V is an interpretation function associating each element ω ∈ Ω with a truth
assignment on the primitive propositions in A,B, . . . ∈ Φ such that V (ω)(A) ∈ {1, 0} for
each ω ∈ Ω and for every proposition in Φ.
For each primitive proposition in Φ, we define M,ω |= A iff V (ω)(A) = 1 and proceed
by induction on the structure of propositional formulas. Since P is defined on events in
F rather than propositions, let [[A]]M denote the set of outcomes within Ω in M where
A is true, which will correspond to a subset of F . The following makes explicit the
relationship between propositions and events for arbitrary propositional formulas A and
B:
i. [[A ∧B]]M = [[A[]M ∩ [[B]]M ,
ii. [[A ∨B]]M = [[A[]M ∪ [[B]]M ,
iii. [[¬A]]M = [[A[]M .
An evidence set is a set of propositions, written E = {E1, E2}. We defined focused
correlation in Equation (1) with respect to random variables Ei, and H, each taking
values 0 or 1. We use the abbreviation E for E = 1 and ¬E for E = 0, and likewise
will use the abbreviation P (E1 ∧ ¬E2 | H) for P (E1 = 1 ∩ E2 = 0 | H = 1). We will
relax notation by expressing focused correlation of propositions as well as of variables,
using the conventions here for distinguishing between propositions and variables to signal
which is which.
2.1 Confirmation measures
A statement E is confirmation to hypothesis H with respect to a classical probability
model specifying the measure P just when E and H are positively correlated under P ,
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that is when P (H | E) > P (H). A confirmation function measures the degree to which
evidence confirms a hypothesis, and there are several proposals.2
inc1(H,E1, E2) := P (H | E1 ∧ E2)− P (H | E1)
inc2(H,E1, E2) :=
P (H | E1 ∧ E2)− P (H | E1)
1− P (H | E1)
ko(H,E) :=
P (E | H)− P (E | ¬H)
P (E | H) + P (E | ¬H)
r(H,E) := log
P (H | E)
P (H)
l(H,E) := log
P (E | H)
P (E | ¬H)
2.2 Comparing equal-relevance evidence sets
In our discussion throughout, we assume that P (D), a probability distribution defined
over a domain of propositions 〈H,E〉, is positive. In addition, we may appeal to two
conditions.
(A1) Positive Relevance: all propositions in E are positively relevant to H just in
case, ∀Ei ∈ E, P (H | Ei) > P (H) > P (H | ¬Ei).
(A2) Equal Relevance: all propositions in a set of evidence E are equally confirmatory
just in case ∀Ei, Ej ∈ E, P (H | Ei) = P (H | Ej), and P (H | ¬Ei) = P (H | ¬Ej).
First, evidence and hypothesis may be correlated or anti-correlated, unless independent.
Thus evidence may be either positively relevant or negatively relevant to a hypothesis,
if it is relevant at all. Condition (A1) restricts attention to cases where evidence is
positively relevant. Second, strength of relevance need not be the same, but condition
(A2) restricts attention to just those cases where all pieces of evidence are equally relevant
to the hypothesis.3 This is the condition we shall explore how to weaken. But first, let’s
see the benefit from a positive distribution over D that satisfies both (A1) and (A2).
2inc1 and inc2 are both variants of L. Jonathan Cohen’s notion of incremental convergence (Cohen
1977): inc1 reports the contribution that E2 simpliciter makes to H, whereas inc2 reports the contri-
bution E2 makes with respect to the possible available evidence; inc1 and inc2 are the two cases that
comprise measure Z (Crupi et al. 2007), where inc2(H,E) is used if P (H | E) > P (H), inc1(H,E)
otherwise. ko is the Kemeny and Oppenheim fitness measure (Kemeny and Oppenheim 1952). r is a
generic relevance measure, versions of which have been endorsed from (Keynes 1921) to (Milne 1997),
among others. l is ordinally equivalent to ko. ko, r, l are typically discussed for evidence E representing
an evidence set E of arbitrary size by a single conjunction of the propositions in E. We will discuss cases
where |E| = 2. See (Kyburg 1983) for an overview of confirmation measures, and (Eells and Fitelson
2002) for a recent discussion.
3See Lemma 4.2 and remarks in the Appendix about the strength of these two assumptions when
combined.
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Proposition 2.1. (Wheeler and Scheines, 2010) If E = {E1, E2} and E∗ =
{E1, E3}, and E ∪ E∗ satisfies (A1) and (A2) with respect to H, then all the follow-
ing inequalities are equivalent:4
• ForH(E) > ForH(E∗)
• r(H,E) > r(H,E∗)
• l(H,E) > l(H,E∗)
• ko(H,E) > ko(H,E∗)
• inc1(H,E) > inc1(H,E∗)
• inc2(H,E) > inc2(H,E∗)
Proposition 2.1 tells us that focused correlation tracks incremental confirmation and
vice versa, but the proof leans on (A2) to isolate the effect of focused correlation on
incremental confirmation. This condition is too restrictive to exploit in an application
and, as observed in the Introduction, it deals with a problematic class of models by
effectively excluding them. In the next section we consider how to preserve these tracking
properties of focused correlation without condition (A2).
3 Unequal Relevance
We consider, as before, two evidence sets E = {E1, E2} and E∗ = {E1, E3}, but now we
shall relax assumption (A2): we no longer require that all propositions Ei, i = 1, 2, 3, are
equally confirmatory. That is, we allow for the degree of positive relevance P (H | Ei) of
the individual pieces of evidence to vary.
What we would like to check now is whether, in this generalized situation, focused
correlation continues to track confirmation, and vice versa. That is, we would like
to explore under what conditions Proposition 2.1 still holds. ‘Confirmation’ is here
understood as quantified by the measures defined in Sec. 2.1. We shall denote these
measures collectively by c(H,E) in the following, i.e., c(H,E) jointly stands for any of
the functions inc1(H,E), inc2(H,E), ko(H,E), r(H,E), and l(H,E).
A quick look at the definitions of these confirmation measures (Sec. 2.1) shows that
they are based only on the probabilities of H conditional on the full evidence set and on
the shared evidence piece E1, but not on the probabilities of H conditional on the distinct
individual pieces E2 and E3, i.e., not on P (H | E2) and P (H | E3). The appearance of
P (H | E2) and P (H | E3) in Equation (1) is therefore a particular feature of focused
correlation. This feature exemplifies the additional input to the measure, which takes
into account the conditional probabilities P (H | Ei) for all Ei ∈ E.
4For the proposition to hold for inc1, we stipulate that inc1(H,E) > inc1(H,E
∗) stands for
inc1(H,E1, E2) > inc1(H,E1, E3). A similar remark applies for interpreting inc2.
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As an aside, we note that the relevance P (H | E1) of the evidence E1 will not enter
into the following considerations, not withstanding its role in inc1 and inc2. This is so
because E1 is shared among both evidence sets E and E∗, and we are here concerned
only with a comparison of the degrees of focused correlation and confirmatory power of
these two sets.
3.1 From focused correlation to confirmation
Let us first describe the condition under which a larger degree of focused correlation for
evidence set {E1, E2} than for {E1, E3} implies larger confirmation of the hypothesis by
{E1, E2} than by {E1, E3}.
Proposition 3.1. If ForH(E1, E2) > ForH(E1, E3) and
P (H | E2)
P (H | E3) >
ForH(E1, E3)
ForH(E1, E2)
, (2)
then also c(H, {E1, E2}) > c(H, {E1, E3}).
Thus the confirmation measures c(H, {E1, E2}) track focused correlation if the bound
(2) is fulfilled. In particular, this will be the case whenever P (H | E2) ≥ P (H | E3), but
the implication ForH(E1, E2) > ForH(E1, E3) ⇒ c(H, {E1, E2}) > c(H, {E1, E3}) will
also hold if P (H | E2) < P (H | E3) by an amount that is a function of the difference
in the focused correlations of the two sets E and E∗, as specified by (2). However,
if P (H | E2) drops below this bound, then the tracking fails, and the confirmation
measures c(H, {E1, E2}) will indicate less confirmatory power for E than E∗ despite the
fact that E has larger focused correlation than E∗.
This observation has an intuitive explanation, as c(H, {E1, E2}) < c(H, {E1, E3})
is equivalent to P (H | E1 ∧ E2) < P (H | E1 ∧ E3) when both (A1) and (A2) hold.
Now, as mentioned above, focused correlation goes a step further than the measures
c(H, {E1, E2}), because it weighs the joint relevance P (H | E) by how much each in-
dividual piece of evidence confirms H. If E1 and E2 individually confirm H very little
compared to the confirmation of H provided by the conjunction E1∧E2, while the prob-
ability of H given E1 ∧ E3 does not exceed by much the product of the probabilities
of H given E1 and E3 alone, then the set {E1, E2} may have larger focused correlation
than the set {E1, E3} even if P (H | E1 ∧ E2) < P (H | E1 ∧ E3). In other words,
ForH(E1, E2) ≥ ForH(E1, E3) may arise from a situation in which P (H | E2) is so much
smaller than P (H | E3) as to be able to counteract the greater confirmatory power of
E∗ over E as quantified by the measures c(H, {E1, E2}).
We will illustrate our results by presenting alternative versions of Mr. Carson’s scan-
dal. In each of our examples, we shall let E1 represent the fact that Carson is divorcing
his wife, E2 = Carson’s trip abroad seated next to a shady financier, E3 = Carson’s
affair with a Brazilian lover, and H = Carson swindled Acme. We begin by considering
the case in which the confirmation measures c(H,E) fail to track focused correlation.
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Example 1. Suppose that the evidence set {E1 = divorce, E2 = travel} has larger
focused correlation than {E1 = divorce, E3 = affair}, with respect to the hypothesis H.
We interpret this relation as saying that evidence of both Carson’s divorce proceedings
and his travel cohere better toward supporting the hypothesis of fraud than evidence of
Carson’s divorce and affair.
But this fact does not necessarily mean that the coincidence of divorce and travel is
also more confirmatory of the hypothesis of fraud than the divorce-plus-affair scenario.
Why not?
Imagine a backstory such that Carson’s affair, considered in isolation, supports fraud
much more strongly than a trip to Brazil, considered in isolation. Perhaps poor Carson
is in over his head: his affair is a surprise to all, and an expensive one at that. His trip
to Rio, although unusual, pales by comparison, and on its own there is no reason to
think that his having a shady seat companion is anything but a coincidence. Relative
to this background knowledge, A, PA(H | E3) > PA(H | E2). Now add the news
of Carson’s divorce proceedings. This would not dent the confirmatory power of the
affair scenario, since adding a divorce to that affair only piles on more expenses for
Carson. But, learning of the divorce would also do little to alter the confirmatory force
of the travel scenario on judging whether Carson is complicit in defrauding Acme. Thus,
PA(H | {E1, E3}) > PA(H | {E1, E2}).
But then there is little reason to believe that we need the coincidence of a divorce and
an affair to send up a red flag in Acme’s fraud department, as opposed to just knowing
of Carson’s liaison. The coherence of divorce and affair may therefore be less than the
coherence of divorce and travel with respect to confirming the hypothesis of fraud, and
still the conjunction of divorce and affair may be more confirmatory of fraud than the
conjunction of divorce and travel. As we have seen, this happens when the confirmatory
power of the affair (considered by itself) becomes sufficiently large in comparison with
the confirmatory power of the travel (considered by itself). When coherence is measured
by focused correlation, what qualifies as ‘sufficiently large’ is then precisely quantified
by the bound (2).
3.2 From confirmation to focused correlation
Let us now tackle the converse relation, namely, the implication from a difference in
confirmation to a difference in focused correlation.
Proposition 3.2. If c(H, {E1, E2}) > c(H, {E1, E3}) and
P (H | E2) ≤ P (H | E3), (3)
then also ForH(E1, E2) > ForH(E1, E3).
The bound (3) is a catch-all condition that holds for all confirmation measures
c(H,E) considered in Section 2.1. It may be tightened by focusing on a particular
measure. For example, for inc1(H,E) and inc2(H,E) the bound is
P (H | E2)
P (H | E3) <
inck(H,E1, E2)
inck(H,E1, E3)
, k = 1, 2, (4)
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which allows for P (H | E2) > P (H | E3) within certain limits.
The existence of a bound on the ratio of P (H | E2) to P (H | E3) has a similar
explanation as the bound (2). If P (H | E2) > P (H | E3) by a sufficiently large amount,
then the larger confirmatory power of E over E∗ may be overshadowed by the fact that
the confirmation of H by E3 alone, with respect to the confirmation by the conjunction
E1 ∧ E3, is much less than the confirmation of H by E2 alone, with respect to the
confirmation by the conjunction E1 ∧E2. Or, put more plainly, the beliefs in the set E∗
cohere better towards supporting H than the beliefs in the set E.
Example 2. In the spirit of the Introduction, suppose that Carson’s affair is viewed
as an ordinary disaster and his travel plans are more suspicious—it is known that he
booked both his seat and his companion’s, let’s say. So, suppose that the conjunction of
divorce and travel is more confirmatory of the hypothesis of fraud than the conjunction
of divorce and an affair on this background knowledge, labeled B: cB(H, {E1, E2}) >
cB(H, {E1, E3}) and PB(H | E1 ∧ E2) > PB(H | E1 ∧ E3).
Now, what happens when we consider focused correlation instead of confirmation?
Equation (1) weighs PB(H | E1 ∧ E2) and PB(H | E1 ∧ E3) by how much each of the
individual pieces of evidence differing between the two evidence sets—that is, Carson’s
travel (E2) and affair (E3)—confirm the suspicion of fraud. If condition (3) is violated,
i.e., if PB(H | E2) > PB(H | E3), this would mean that isolated knowledge of Carson’s
travel makes us more inclined to think of the possibility that he may be engaged in
fraudulent business than if we simply heard that Carson is embroiled in an affair. It
is the merit of focused correlation to now put up a cautionary flag when it comes to
considering the implications for the relative degrees of coherence of the two evidence
sets {E1 = divorce, E2 = travel} and {E1 = divorce, E3 = affair}. How so?
The argument is similar to the discussion of the previous example in Sec. 3.2. Since
according to background B the evidence of travel, considered in isolation, is already more
supportive of the hypothesis of fraud than the evidence of an affair, also considered in
isolation, and since the only other piece of evidence—namely, the fact that Carson is in
the midst of divorce proceedings—is common to both evidence sets, then one should not
automatically conclude that it is the coincidence of divorce and travel that boosts our
confidence in fraud. Rather, it may be the case that the evidence of travel alone is what
makes the hypothesis so eminently plausible, not the fact that it coincides with Carson’s
divorce. Conversely, while Carson’s affair alone may barely raise suspicions of fraud,
its coincidence with Carson’s being in the midst of a messy—and potentially financially
threatening—divorce may boost the likelihood of fraud by a large margin. In other
words, although the coincidence of Carson’s divorce and travel is more confirmatory of
fraud than the coincidence of his divorce and affair, the latter evidence set may well be
judged to have a larger degree of coherence. Focused correlation captures this subtlety.
Conversely, if condition (3) is obeyed, i.e., if PB(H | E2) ≤ PB(H | E3), focused cor-
relation and confirmation will gravitate toward favoring the same evidence set. Together
with the fact that PB(H | E1 ∧ E2) > PB(H | E1 ∧ E3), we can now safely conclude
that divorce and travel cohere better toward supporting the hypothesis of fraud than the
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conjunction of divorce and affair: although evidence of travel alone is less (or equally)
indicative of fraud compared with the evidence of an affair, when taken together with
the evidence of an ongoing divorce, Carson’s travel will ring Acme’s alarm bells more
readily than evidence of Carson’s involvement with his Brazilian sweetheart.
3.3 Bidirectional tracking
Propositions 3.1 and 3.2 show that when the ratio of P (H | E2) to P (H | E3) is within a
certain range, focused correlation will be tracked by confirmation, and when it is within
another range, focused correlation will track confirmation. It is important to note that
these ranges overlap. Propositions 3.1 and 3.2 readily quantify this overlap, i.e., the
range of values of P (H|E2)/P (H|E3), for which bidirectional tracking holds. Combining
Propositions 3.1 and 3.2 yields:
Corollary 3.1. If
ForH(E1, E3)
ForH(E1, E2)
<
P (H | E2)
P (H | E3) ≤ 1, (5)
then ForH(E1, E2) > ForH(E1, E3) ⇔ c(H, {E1, E2}) > c(H, {E1, E3}).
That is, ensuring that the tracking goes both ways does not require us to impose the
rather strong assumption (A2) of equal relevance of all bits of evidence.
Choosing a particular confirmation measure allows us to extend even further the
range over which the bidirectional tracking holds. For example, for inc1(H,E) or
inc2(H,E), we can use the bound (4) instead of (3), which gives a ‘relaxed’ version
of Corollary 3.1:
Corollary 3.2. If
ForH(E1, E3)
ForH(E1, E2)
<
P (H | E2)
P (H | E3) <
inck(H,E1, E2)
inck(H,E1, E3)
, k = 1, 2, (6)
then ForH(E1, E2) > ForH(E1, E3) ⇔ inck(H, {E1, E2}) > inck(H, {E1, E3}).
Fig. 1 illustrates the different ranges of P (H|E2)/P (H|E3) for which uni- and bidirec-
tional tracking between focused correlation and confirmation obtains.
3.4 Equality of focused correlation and confirmation
For the sake of completeness, let us also explicitly consider the connection between equal
values of focused correlation and equal values of confirmation:
Proposition 3.3. ForH(E1, E2) = ForH(E1, E3) ⇔ c(H, {E1, E2}) = c(H, {E1, E3}) if
and only if
P (H | E2) = P (H | E3). (7)
In other words, equal values of focused correlation for the two sets E and E∗ translate
into equal degrees c(H, {E1, E2}) and c(H, {E1, E3}) of confirmation—and vice versa—
if and only if the equal-relevance assumption (A2) is made. The reason for this result
should now be clear from the above discussion of Propositions 3.1 and 3.2.
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- P (H|E2)
P (H|E3)
ForH(E1,E3)
ForH(E1,E2)
inc1,2(H,E1,E2)
inc1,2(H,E1,E3)
1
For ⇔ c
For⇔ inc1,2
For ⇒ c
c ⇒ For
inc1,2 ⇒ For
Figure 1: Regimes of P (H|E2)/P (H|E3) for which focused correlation tracks and/or is tracked by
confirmation measures. P (H | Ei) is the relevance of a piece of evidence Ei for a given hy-
pothesis H. ‘For ⇒ c’ is a shorthand for the implication ForH(E1, E2) > ForH(E1, E3) ⇒
c(H, {E1, E2}) > c(H, {E1, E3}), which represents a tracking of focused correlation by the
confirmation measures c(H,E). Similarly for ‘c ⇒ For.’ Over a range of values for
P (H|E2)/P (H|E3), bidirectional tracking obtains (bold box), i.e., ForH(E1, E2) > ForH(E1, E3) ⇔
c(H, {E1, E2}) > c(H, {E1, E3}). For specific choices of c(H,E), for example, for the measures
inc1(H,E) or inc2(H,E) shown here, the tracking range is extended further.
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4 Discussion
In this paper, we have demonstrated that the equal-relevance assumption can be relaxed
within certain limits without upsetting the bidirectional tracking between focused cor-
relation and several incremental confirmation measure; if only unidirectional tracking is
required, these limits become even less stringent. However, if the degrees of relevance
diverge too strongly, the tracking fails. We have shown that the ratio of P (H | E2) to
P (H | E3) is crucial in assessing, both qualitatively and quantitatively, when and where
the tracking fails.
However, this observation should not be viewed as reflecting a failure or deficiency
of the measure of focused correlation. Rather, it may be considered as illuminating a
shortcoming of incremental confirmation measures, since they fail to take into account
the additional information provided by the relevance of each individual bit of evidence.
As we have seen, this information is important in flagging a situation in which a large
boost in confirmation caused by adding a piece of evidence has nothing or only little to
do with the coincidence of this evidence with the existing body of evidence. One merit
of focused correlation is to detect such cases.
In one class of cases that has received a lot of attention, namely, the single-factor
common-cause model mentioned in the Introduction, any measure linking positive as-
sociation to positive confirmation breaks down, and comparisons (assuming (A2)) are
never false because they cannot be different. But these facts take nothing away from
focused correlation, for two reasons. First, because this class of models is determined
non-parametrically, we can learn whether one hypothesis is a common cause (Silva et al.
2006) and then attack the problem by other methods—namely by looking at the relative
strengths of the evidence. We don’t need the sign of focused correlation in single-factor
common-cause models to indicate the sign of confirmation if we understand clearly when
the two do not align. In the case of single-factor common-cause models, the association of
the evidence is completely determined by the relevant strengths of the evidence (Danks
and Glymour 2001). Faulting focused correlation for failing to indicate confirmation
in this class of models is akin to faulting screwdrivers for failing to drive nails: it is a
true claim that is entirely beside the point. Second, it should be clear that the failure
of focused correlation to track differences in confirmation of evidence in common-cause
models in Proposition 2.1 is driven by (A2) rather than a deficiency in focused corre-
lation. But, again, although our results here allow for some tracking in common-cause
models, at bottom a difference in confirmation in this class of models boils down to a
difference in the individual strengths, P (H | Ei).
Focused correlation is defined generally for n evidence variables, but we only discuss
evidence sets of size 2, and difficulties loom for attempts to make comparisons of larger
evidence sets (Bovens and Hartmann 2006). Even though focused correlation is defined
for arbitrary-sized information sets, the relationships of confirmation, covariance, and
correlation are binary—or three-place in conditional form. Thus, the expansion of ev-
idence sets beyond size two will require a partition of the evidence set, since there are
many incremental confirmation questions that are compatible with one focused corre-
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lation problem involving an evidence set of size greater than two. To expect otherwise
is a category mistake, and negative results should be no surprise. That said, if there
isn’t an interest in linking focused correlation for large evidence sets—which, technically,
isn’t a measure of correlation but is instead a distance-from-independence measure—to
confirmation, then one may explore extending the results presented here to facilitate
direct comparisons of large evidence sets.
Finally, two commonly discussed confirmation measures have been omitted from dis-
cussion, Carnap’s (1962) relevance measure r, and the old evidence measure oe (Chris-
tensen 1999, Joyce 1999), which are defined as
r(H,E) := P (H ∧ E)− P (H)P (E),
oe(H,E) := P (H | E)− P (H | ¬E).
Neither measure is tracked by focused correlation. The reason is that both measures
are less constrained than incremental confirmation measures. In the case of Carnap’s
measure of relevance, observe that r(H,E) is the covariance of the binary variables H
and E,
Cov(H,E) = P (H ∧ E)− P (H)P (E) = P (H)(P (E | H)− P (E)).
Although positive covariance for H and a single evidence variable E is ensured by the
positive relevance condition (A1), conditions (A1) and (A2) and Equation (9a) do not
constrain the sign of r(H,E) for evidence sets E of size two. In the case of oe, there is
some recognition already of the difference between incremental confirmation measures
and measures for novelty of evidence like oe (Joyce 1999). The failure to compare ev-
idence sets by their degree of surprise, particularly under the restrictive conditions of
positivity, (A1), (A2), and Equation (9a), is an additional reason to sharply distin-
guish between these two types of measures. Counter-models for oe are discussed in the
Appendix.
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Appendix
The following proofs of Propositions 3.1–3.3 are similar in spirit and rely heavily on the
following Lemma 4.1, which follows from the definition of ForH(E1, E2) in Equation (1).
Lemma 4.1. If ForH(E1, E2) = λForH(E1, E3) with λ > 0, then
P (H | E1 ∧ E2)
P (H | E1 ∧ E3) = λ
P (H | E2)
P (H | E3) . (8)
Proof of Lemma 4.1
P (H | E1 ∧ E2)P (H)
P (H | E1)P (H | E2) = λ
P (H | E1 ∧ E3)P (H)
P (H | E1)P (H | E3)
P (H | E1 ∧ E2)
P (H | E2) ×
P (H)
P (H | E1) = λ
P (H | E1 ∧ E3)
P (H | E3) ×
P (H)
P (H | E1)
P (H | E1 ∧ E2)
P (H | E1 ∧ E3) = λ
P (H | E2)
P (H | E3) .

Proof of Proposition 3.1
We begin with two observations, assuming (A1) and (A2):
P (H | E1 ∧ E2) > P (H | E1 ∧ E3) ⇔ c(H, {E1, E2}) > c(H, {E1, E3}), (9a)
P (H | E1 ∧ E2) = P (H | E1 ∧ E3) ⇔ c(H, {E1, E2}) = c(H, {E1, E3}). (9b)
Turning to ForH(E), by (A2), P (H|E2)/P (H|E3) = 1. So, by Lemma 4.1, the LHS of
Equations (9a) and (9b) may be expressed by Equation (10) when λ > 1 and λ = 1,
respectively.
P (H | E1 ∧ E2)
P (H | E1 ∧ E3) = λ. (10)
Without (A2), observe:
P (H | E1 ∧ E2)
P (H | E1 ∧ E3) = λ
P (H | E2)
P (H | E3) ,
P (H | E1 ∧ E2)
P (H | E1 ∧ E3) ×
P (H | E3)
P (H | E2) = λ,
P (H | E1 ∧ E2)P (H)
P (H | E1)P (H | E2) ×
P (H | E1)P (H | E3)
P (H | E1 ∧ E3)P (H) = λ,
ForH(E1, E2)
ForH(E1, E3)
= λ. (11)
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So λ > 1, given (11) and ForH(E1, E2) > ForH(E1, E3), by hypothesis. Therefore,
P (H | E1 ∧ E2) > P (H | E1 ∧ E3) and thus c(H, {E1, E2}) > c(H, {E1, E3}) iff
P (H | E2)
P (H | E3) >
1
λ
=
ForH(E1, E3)
ForH(E1, E2)
. (12)

Proof of Proposition 3.2
By assumption, c(H, {E1, E2}) > c(H, {E1, E3}), and thus P (H | E1 ∧ E2) > P (H |
E1 ∧ E3) from Equations (9a) and (9b). Then by Lemma 4.1
P (H | E1 ∧ E2)
P (H | E1 ∧ E3) >
P (H | E2)
P (H | E3) ,
P (H | E1 ∧ E2)
P (H | E2) >
P (H | E1 ∧ E3)
P (H | E3) .
We can tighten the bound if we choose a particular confirmation measure. For example,
inck(H,E1, E2) = γ inck(H,E1, E3)
⇔ P (H | E1 ∧ E2) = γP (H | E1 ∧ E3), k = 1, 2,
and thus the bound is
P (H | E2)
P (H | E3) < γ =
inck(H,E1, E2)
inck(H,E1, E3)
, (13)
which proves Equation (4). 
Proof of Proposition 3.3
If ForH(E1, E2) = ForH(E1, E3), then Definition (1) implies that P (H | E1∧E2) = P (H |
E1 ∧ E3) iff P (H | E2) = P (H | E3). Conversely, if c(H, {E1, E2}) = c(H, {E1, E3}),
then Equation (9b) implies that P (H | E1 ∧ E2) = P (H | E1 ∧ E3), and Definition (1)
then shows that ForH(E1, E2) = ForH(E1, E3) iff P (H | E2) = P (H | E3). 
Counter-models for measure tracking oe
To show that P (H | E1 ∧ E2) > P (H | E1 ∧ E3) does not entail oe(H, {E1, E2}) >
oe(H, {E1, E3}) under positivity, (A1) and (A2), it suffices to provide a model in which
P (H | E1 ∧ E2) > P (H | E1 ∧ E3) (14)
but
P (H | E1 ∧ E2)− P (H | ¬E1 ∨ ¬E2) 6> P (H | E1 ∧ E3)− P (H | ¬E1 ∨ ¬E3). (15)
The constraints (A1) and (A2) are strong by design, and we can simplify Equation (15)
by observing the following Lemma.
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Lemma 4.2. If P (D) is a positive probability distribution over 〈H,E〉 satisfying (A1)
and (A2), then
i. P (E1) = P (E2) = P (E3), and
ii. P (H | ¬E1) = P (H | ¬E2) = P (H | ¬E3) = α.
Proof of Lemma 4.2
4.2.i.: From (A2), it follows that the covariances of each piece of evidence with the
hypothesis is identical, P (Ei|H)/P (Ei) for i = 1, 2, 3, which can be rewritten as
P (Ei)[P (H | Ei)− P (H)].
(A2) guarantees 4.2.i., and (A1) ensures that the covariance is positive.
4.2.ii.: From total probability, (A2) and Lemma 4.2.i.:
P (H) = P (H | Ei)P (Ei) + P (H | ¬Ei)1− P (Ei).

Lemma 4.2 allows for the reduction of (15) to
P (H | E1 ∧ E2)− [2α− P (H | ¬E1 ∧ ¬E2)]
6>
P (H | E1 ∧ E3)− [2α− P (H | ¬E1 ∧ ¬E3)]. (16)
But while P (H | E1 ∧ E2) > P (H | E1 ∧ E3) by hypothesis, the remaining terms are
unconstrained. Counter-models exist which violate the inequality. Analogously, there
are counter models in which P (H | E1 ∧ E2) = P (H | E1 ∧ E3) but oe(H,E1 ∧ E2) 6=
oe(E1 ∧ E3).
In sum, more incremental confirmation does not ensure more evidential surprise, and
it should be clear from the discussion that the converse does not hold either.
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